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How Special are Cohen and Random Forcings
i.e. Boolean Algebras of the family of subsets
of reals modulo meagre or null
Saharon Shelah
Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Department of Mathematics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A.
The feeling that those two forcing notions -Cohen and Random- (equivalently the
corresponding Boolean algebras P(R)/(meagre sets), P(R)/(null sets)) are special, was
probably old and widespread. A reasonable interpretation is to show them unique, or
“minimal” or at least characteristic in a family of “nice forcing” like Borel. We shall
interpret “nice” as Souslin as suggested by Judah Shelah [JdSh 292]; (discussed below).
We divide the family of Souslin forcing to two, and expect that: among the first part, i.e.
those adding some non-dominated real, Cohen is minimal (=is below every one), while
among the rest random is quite characteristic even unique. Concerning the second class
we have weak results, concerning the first class, our results look satisfactory.
Related is von Neumann’s problem which in our language is:
(∗) is there a ωω-bounding c.c.c. forcing notion adding reals which is not equivalent to
the measure algebra (i.e. control measure problem)?
dn 2/92, Publication 480, partially supported by the basic research fund, Israeli
Academy, and partially sponsored by the Edmund Landau Center for research
in Mathematical Analysis, supported by the Minerva Foundation (Germany) .
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Velickovic (and , as I have lately learnt, also Fremlin) suggests another problem (it
says less on forcings which are ωω-bounding but it says also much on the others).
(∗∗) is there a c.c.c. forcing notion P which adds new reals and such that for every
f ∈ ωω ∩ V P there is h ∈ V such that (∀n)|h(n)| ≤ 2n, and f(n) ∈ h(n) for all n.
The version of it for Souslin forcing was our starting point.
We have two main results: one (1.14) says that Cohen forcing is “minimal” in the
first class, the other (1.10) says that all c.c.c. Souslin forcing have a property shared by
Cohen forcing and Random real forcing (this is the answer to (∗∗) for Souslin forcing), so
it gives a weak answer to the problem on how special is random forcing, but says much on
all c.c.c. Souslin forcing. Earlier by Gitik Shelah [Sh 412] , any σ-centered Souslin forcing
notion add a Cohen real. We thank Andrzej Roslanowski for proof reading the paper very
carefully correcting many and pointing out a flawed proof.
§1 A Souslin forcing which adds an unbounded real add a Cohen real
1.1 Notation: 0) ℓg(η) is the length of η.
1) T denotes subtrees of ω>ω, i.e., T ⊆ ω>ω is non empty, [ν ⊳ η& η ∈ T ⇒ ν ∈ T ] and
[ν ∈ T ⇒ (∃η ∈ T )(ν ⊳ η)]. For η ∈ T let T [η]
def
= {ν ∈ T : ν E η or η E ν} and let
limT = {η ∈ ωω :
∧
n η↾n ∈ T}
2) sp(T ) = {η ∈ T : (∃≥2k)[η̂〈k〉 ∈ T ]},
ℓsp(T ) = {ℓg(η) : η ∈ sp(T )}.
3) [A]µ = {B ⊆ A : |B| = µ}, [A]<µ =
⋃
0≤κ<µ[A]
κ
4) We say T is u-large if: u ∈ [ω]ℵ0 and for some n∗ < ω: if n∗ < n < m < ω, n ∈ u,m ∈ u
then [n,m) ∩ ℓsp(T ) 6= ∅.
5) We say T is strongly u−large if: u ∈ [ω]ℵ0 , and for some n∗ < ω, if n∗ < n < m < ω,
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n ∈ u, m ∈ u then (∀η ∈ T ∩ n2)(∃ν)[η E ν ∈ spT & ℓgν < m].
6) Ok is a sequence of length k of zeroes.
7) (∀∞n) means: for every large enough n < ω. (∃∞n) means for infinitely many n < ω.
8) We say T is (u, h¯)-large if : u ∈ [ω]ℵ0 , hk : ω → ω \ {0, 1}, h¯ = 〈hk : k < ω〉 and for
every k < ω, T is (u, hk)-large which means: for infinitely many n ∈ u we have:
n ≤ m ∈ u & |u ∩m \ n| < hk(n)⇒ Min (ℓsp(T ) \m) < Min (u \ (m+ 1)).
Note
(∗) if hn = n for every n < ω this is equivalent to: for every k < ω, for some
consequtive members i0 < i1 < . . . < ik of u , for every ℓ < k we have [iℓ, iℓ+1) ∩ ℓsp(T ) is
not empty
9) We say 〈Tℓ : ℓ < n〉 is (u, h¯)-large if: u ∈ [ω]
ℵ0 , h¯ = 〈hk : k < ω〉, hk : ω → ω \ {0, 1} and
for every k < ω for infinitely many n ∈ u we have
n ≤ m ∈ u& |u ∩m \ n| < hk(n)⇒
∧
ℓMin (ℓspTℓ \m) < Min (u \ (n+ 1)).
10) If hk = h for k < ω we write h instead of h¯.
11) We use forcing notions with the convention that larger means with more information.
12) In a partial order (=forcing notion), incompatible means have no common upper bound.
1.2 Definition: A statement ϕ(x) on reals is absolute if for every model M extending V
with the same ordinals (mainly M = V or a generic extension) and N , a model of ZFC−
(which is a transitive set or class of M ) with ωM1 ⊆ N and a ∈ N , we have N |= ϕ[a] iff
M |= ϕ[a].
1.3 Definition: 1) P is a c.c.c. Souslin forcing notion if: P = (P,≤) is such that:
(a) there is a
∑1
1-definition ϕ
a of the set P (which is ⊆ R)
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(b) there is a
∑1
1-definition ϕ
b of a partial order ≤ on P
(c) there is a
∑1
1-definition ϕ
c of the relation “p, q incompatible in P”, see (1.1(12))
(hence it is ∆11, as by the above it is Σ
1
1, now use Definition 1.3(1) (a)+(b), it implies
being compatible is
∑1
1 hence being incompatible is
∏1
1).
(d) (P,≤) satisfies the c.c.c..
2) Note: we do not distinguish strictly between P and the three
∑1
1-formulas ϕ
a, ϕb, ϕc
respectively appearing in the definition.
3) P is a Souslin forcing notion if (a) + (b) holds.
1.3A Remark: On (c.c.c.) Souslin forcing see Judah Shelah [JuSh 292] e.g.
1.4 Claim: 1) “ϕa, ϕb, ϕc are
∑1
1-formulas as in 1.3(1)” is absolute.
2) For P a c.c.c. Souslin forcing notion, “{rn : n < ω} is a maximal antichain of P” is a
conjunction of a
∑1
1 and a
∏1
1 statements.
3) Being a maximal antichain is absolute (even conjunction of
∏1
1 and
∑1
1) hence so is
“being a P -name of a member of ω2 (or ωω)”.
4) If P is a c.c.c. Souslin forcing notion , p0 ∈ P and P
∗ =df {p ∈ P : P |= ”p0 ≤ p} (with
the inherited order) then P ∗ is a c.c.c. Souslin forcing notion too .
Proof: E.g.
(2) The
∑1
1 part is to say “rn ∈ P”, so if “x ∈ P” is also
∏1
1 then this statement is
∏1
1; the∏1
1 part is to say (∀x)
[
x /∈ P ∨
∨
n<ω(x, rn compatible)
]
(by Definition 1.3(1)((a)+(c)));
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a third part is
∧
n<m<ω (rn, rm incompatible) which are
∏1
1 and ∆
1
1 resp.
(3) Follows by (2) 1.4
1.5 Lemma: Assume P is a c.c.c. Souslin forcing,
˜
r a P -name of a new member of ω2.
Then for some infinite u ⊆ ω, for every p ∈ P , the tree Tp[
˜
r] (see Definition 1.6 below) is
u-large (see 1.1(5)).
1.6 Definition: Tp[
˜
r] = {η ∈ ω>2 : p /⊢P “η 6=
˜
r↾ℓgη”} (clearly it is a tree).
Before we turn to proving Lemma 1.5, we prove:
1.7 Claim: 1) For a given c.c.c. Souslin forcing notion P (i.e. as in Definition 1.3(1))
and P -name
˜
r of a member of ω2, the conclusion of 1.5 is an absolute statement (actually
∑1
2).
2) The statement on u, p (and also on
˜
r) that they is as required in 1.5, is a
∑1
1 statement.
3) Also “
˜
r is a P -name of a new real” is absolute in fact a
∏1
1-statement ..
4) If P is c.c.c. Souslin forcing notion, above every p ∈ P there are two incompatible
conditions then forcing with P add a new real.
Proof: 1) Let
˜
r be represented by
〈
〈(pηi , t
η
i ) : i < ω〉: η ∈
ω>2
〉
where {pηi : i < ω} ⊆ P is
a maximal antichain of P , tηi a truth value and p
η
i ⊢P “η ⊳
˜
r iff tηi ”. For 1.5, the failure
of the statement can be expressed by:
(∗) (∀u)(∃p)
[
u ⊆ ω finite or p ∈ P &(∃∞n ∈ u)(∀η)[η ∈ n2& η ∈ Tp(
˜
r) ⇒ ¬(∃ν)[η E
ν& ℓgν < Min (u \ (n+ 1))& ν̂〈0〉 ∈ Tp(
˜
r)& ν̂〈1〉 ∈ Tp(
˜
r)]
]
.
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Now the statement “ρ ∈ Tp(
˜
r)” is equivalent to “p /⊢P [ρ /⊳
˜
r]” which is equivalent to
(∗∗)
∨
i<ω(t
ρ
i = truth & p, p
ρ
i compatible.)
It is enough to show that (∗) is a
∏1
2-statement hence it is enough to show that inside
the large parenthesis there is a
∑1
1-statement. In (∗) inside the large parenthesis, ignoring
quantifications over ω, we note that “p ∈ P” is
∑1
1, and then we have to consider (∗∗),
on which it is enough to prove that it is a ∆11 statement [actually we have three instances
of it - all negatives]. By Definition 1.3(1)(c) it is
∏1
1 and by Definition 1.3(1)(b) (and the
compatible meaning having a common upper bound) it is
∑1
1.
2) The proof is included in the proofs of parts (1) and (3).
3) Easy.
[
Why? the statement is (∀p)[p /∈ P ∨
∨
η∈ω>2 [η̂〈0〉 ∈ Tp(
˜
r)& η̂〈1〉 ∈
Tp(
˜
r)]]. Now inside the parenthesis we have p /∈ P which is
∏1
1 and two instances of (∗∗)
which, as shown above, is a
∏1
1-statement.
]
4) Easy, e.g. in V Levy(ℵ0,2
ℵ0) we ask: is there p ∈ P such that Gp =
df {q : q ∈
PV , q ≤ p} is a directed subset of PV , generic over V , i.e. not disjoint to any maximal
antichain of PV from V ? By the assumption if such p exist , necessarily Gp /∈ V ,and by
the homogeneity we can find Levy-names
˜
p,
˜
G
˜
p of such objects so in V
Levy we can find a
perfect set of such Gp’s , so the p’s form an antichain of size continuum but this is absolute
. So there is no such p, letting {{pi,j : i < ω} : j < ω} list the maximal antichains of P
V
from PV (the list in V Levy ), and we define a p-name
˜
η ∈ ωω : (in V Levy):
˜
η(n) =the
unique m such that pn,m ∈ GP , the generic subset of P
V Levy . This is a P -name of a new
real (all in V Levy(ℵ0,2
ℵ0) and by part (3) +1.4(2) its existence is absolute . 1.7
Remark: The use of QD below can be replaced. QD is called Mathias forcing. See on it
[Sh-b].
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1.8 Proof of Lemma 1.5: Assume that the conclusion fails (for
˜
r, a P -name of a new
member of ω2, which will be fixed until the end of the proof of Lemma 1.5). For D a filter
on ω (containing the co-bounded subsets of ω) let QD = {(w,A) : w ⊆ ω finite, A ∈ D
and max(w) < MinA (when w 6= ∅)} (and if w ⊆ ω is finite A ⊆ ω we identify (w,A) with
(w,A ∩ (maxw, ω))); the order is defined by (w1, A1) ≤ (w2, A2) iff w1 ⊆ w2 ⊆ w1 ∪ A1,
A1 ⊇ A2. Let (w1, A1) ≤pr (ω2, A2) (pure extension) iff w1 = w2, A1 ⊇ A2. Clearly QD
is a partial order satisfying the c.c.c. and {q : q0 ≤pr q} is directed for each q0 ∈ QD. Let
˜
w = ∪{w : (w,A) ∈
˜
GQD}, clearly
˜
w is a QD-name and any G ⊆ QD generic over V can
be reconstructed from
˜
w[G] : G = {(v, A) ∈ QD : v ⊆
˜
w[G] ⊆ v ∪ A}. Without loss of
generality CH holds (by claim 1.7(1), e.g. force with Levy(ℵ1, 2
ℵ0)), hence we can choose
D as a Ramsey ultrafilter on ω. So as is well known that:
⊗1 if
˜
ℓ < 2 is a QD-name and q ∈ Q then for some q
′, q ≤pr q
′ ∈ QD, q
′ forces a value to
˜
ℓ.
So after forcing with QD, the conclusion of 1.5 still fails (by claim 1.7(1)). Hence for
some q∗ ∈ QD and QD-names
˜
p,
˜
T , (remember that
˜
r remains a P -name ) we have q∗
⊢QD “
˜
p ∈ P,
˜
r of ω2,
˜
T = T
˜
p[
˜
r] is not
˜
w-large, such that: for arbitrarily large n ∈
˜
w,
(
˜
w-the QD-name) the interval
[
n,Min (
˜
w \ (n + 1))
)
is disjoint to lsp(
˜
T ) ” ; also we can
assume that ⊢QD “
˜
p ∈ P ,
˜
r remains a P -name of a new member of ω2 and
˜
T = T
˜
p[
˜
r] ”
. For q ∈ QD let S[q] =: {η ∈
ω>2 : for some q′, q ≤pr q
′ and q′ ⊢QD “η ∈
˜
T”}; note that
S[q] is also equal to {η ∈ ω>2 : for no q′, q ≤pr q
′ ∈ QD, q
′ ⊢QD “η /∈
˜
T”} (just apply ⊗1).
Now note
⊗2 S[q] is a subtree (of
ω>2) and if q1 ≤pr q2 (in QD) then S[q1] ⊇ S[q2], (in fact they
are equal).
⊗3 if q
∗ ≤ q ∈ QD then for some q1 ≥ q and m we have: S[q1] has no splitting in any
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level ≥ m.
Why? let n = maxwq; so q forces that: for some m, m ∈
˜
w, m ≥ n, and Min [(ℓspT
˜
p[
˜
r] \
m] ≥ Min [
˜
w \ (m+ 1)]. Before proving ⊗3, repeatedly using ⊗1 we can assume
⊗4 if m ∈ A
q, v ⊆ m ∩ Aq, η ∈ m2 then the condition (wq ∪ v ∪ {m}, A \ (m+ 1)) ∈ QD
forces ( ⊢QD ) a truth values to the following:
(α) η ∈ T
˜
p(
˜
r)
(β) (∃ν)
[
η E ν ∈ ω>2& ℓgν < Min (
˜
w \ (m+ 1))& ν ∈ sp(T
˜
p(
˜
r))
]
.
(Recall the definition of a Ramsey ultrafilter by game.)
By the sentence before the last, for some m ∈ Aq and v ⊆ Aq ∩m for every η∗ ∈ m2,
if we get a positive answer for (α) then we get a negative answer for (β); let q′ = (wq ∪
v ∪ {m}, Aq \ (m + 1)); so q′ forces those two statements. Let for k ∈ Aq \ (m + 1),
qk = (wq ∪ v ∪ {m}, Aq \ k) (so q′ ≤pr q
k) and it forces ( ⊢QD) “every η ∈
m2 ∩ T
˜
p[
˜
r] has
a unique extension in T
˜
p(
˜
r) ∩ k2”, as required in ⊗3.
The rest of the argument will be used again so just note that proving Claim 1.9 below
enough for finishing the proof of 1.5.
1.9 Claim: Assume P is a c.c.c. Souslin forcing,
˜
r a P -name of a new real, QD, S[q] (for
q ∈ QD) chosen as above. Then ⊗3 above is impossible.
Proof: So assume ⊗3 holds and we shall get, eventually a contradiction.
For this end we define a forcing notion Q∗ = Q∗D, Q
∗
D = {(m¯, q¯): for some n =
n(q¯) = n(m¯, q¯) we have q¯ = 〈qη : η ∈
n2〉, q∗ ≤ qη ∈ QD, for each η ∈
n2 the sequence
〈|S[qη] ∩
k2| : k < ω〉 is bounded, m¯ = 〈mν : ν ∈
n>2〉, mν < ω and if ν̂〈ℓ〉E ηℓ ∈ n2 for
ℓ = 0, 1 and k < ω then |S[qη0 ] ∩ S[qη1 ] ∩
k2| ≤ mν}.
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The order is defined by (m¯1, q¯1) ≤ (m¯2, q¯2) iff n(q¯1) ≤ n(q¯2), m¯1 = m¯2↾n(q¯
1)>2 and
for η ∈ n(q¯
2)2 we have q1
η↾n(q¯1)
≤ q2η.
ClearlyQ∗D satisfies the c.c.c. as for any (m¯
∗, w¯∗) the set {(m¯, q¯) ∈ Q∗D : m¯ = m¯
∗, wqη = w∗η
for every η ∈ n(q¯)2} is directed (in Q∗D).
Also,
⊗5 for every n, {(m¯, q¯) ∈ Q
∗
D: n(q¯) ≥ n} is a dense (and open) subset of Q
∗
D.[
Why? it is enough to prove that for any given (m¯0, q¯0) ∈ Q∗D with n(0)
def
= n(q¯0),
there is (m¯1, q¯1) such that (m¯0, q¯0) ≤ (m¯1, q¯1) ∈ Q∗D with n(q¯
1) = n(0) + 1; let
q1η = q
0
η↾n(0)
, and m1ν is: m
0
ν if ν ∈
n(0)>2 , and max{|S[q0ν ] ∩
k2| : k < ω} if ν ∈ n(0)2.
Check
]
.
For G∗ ⊆ Q∗D generic over V , let for η ∈
ω>2,
˜
wη[G
∗] be
⋃
{wr : there is (m¯, q¯) ∈ G∗,
r = q
η↾n and n = n(q¯) ≤ ℓg(η)} it is well defined). If η ∈ (
ω2)V [G
∗] let
˜
wη[G
∗] be
⋃
k<ω wη↾k[G
∗].
Also Q∗D adds a perfect set of generics for QD, moreover: in V [G
∗] for every η ∈
(ω2)V [G
∗],
˜
wη[G
∗] defined above is generic for QD over V , which means Gη
def
= {(v, A) : v ⊆
˜
wη[G
∗] ⊆ v ∪ A} is a generic subset of QD over V ; this holds by ⊗6 , ⊗7 below .
⊗6 if (m¯, q¯) ∈ Q
∗
D and
˜
τ is a QD-name of an ordinal then we can find q¯
1 such that
(m¯, q¯) ≤ (m¯, q¯1), n(q¯1) = n(q¯) and for every η ∈ n(q¯
1)2, the condition q1η forces a value
to
˜
τ .[
Why? let 〈ηk : k < 2
n(q¯)〉 list n(q¯)2. We now define by induction on k ≤ 2n(q¯), a
sequence r¯k = 〈rkη : η ∈
n(q¯)2〉 such that:
(a) (m¯, r¯k) ∈ Q∗D
(b) (m¯, r¯k) ≤ (m¯, r¯k+1) (i.e. QD |= “r
k
η ≤ r
k+1
η ” for η ∈
n(q¯)2)
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(c) r¯0 = q¯
(d) rk+1ηk forces a value to
˜
τ (for the forcing notion QD).
If we succeed then q¯1
def
= r¯(2
n(q¯)) is as required; as r¯0 is as required the only problem
is to find r¯k+1 being given r¯k. First we can find mk < ω, such that no S[r
k
η ] (for η ∈
n(q¯)2)
has a splitting node of level ≥ mk, and mk > n(q¯). Second we find r
k,∗
ηk
∈ QD such that:
QD |=“r
k
ηk
≤pr r
k,∗
ηk
” and rk,∗ηk forces a truth value to each statement of the form “ν ∈ T
˜
p[
˜
r]”
for ν ∈ mk≥2. By the definition of S[rkηk ] necessarily r
k,∗
ηk
⊢QD“Tp[
˜
r] ∩mk≥ 2 ⊆ S[rkηk ]”.
Thirdly choose rk+1ηk ∈ QD, such that QD |= “ r
k,∗
ηk
≤ rk+1ηk ” and r
k+1
ηk
forces a value to
˜
τ
(possible by density) and S[rk+1ηk ] has no splitting above some level (use ⊗3). Fourth, let
rk+1η = r
k
η for η ∈
n(q¯)2 \ {ηk}; we still have to check |S[r
k+1
ν0
] ∩ S[rk+1ν1 ] ∩
m2| ≤ mν when
ν̂〈ℓ〉E νℓ ∈ n(q¯)2; by the induction hypothesis without loss of generality ηk ∈ {ν0, ν1}, so
let ηk = νℓ(∗). If m ≤ mk then S[r
k+1
νℓ(∗)
] ∩ m2 ⊆ S[rkνℓ(∗) ] and we are done by the induction
hypothesis. If m > mk, by the choice of mk, S[r
k+1
ν1−ℓ(∗)
] has no splitting nodes of level ≥ mk
hence |S[rk+1νℓ(∗) ] ∩ S[r
k+1
ν1−ℓ(∗)
] ∩ m2| ≤ |S[rk+1νℓ(∗) ] ∩ S[r
k+1
ν1−ℓ(∗)
] ∩ (mk)2|, and use the previous
sentence. So we can carry the induction and r¯(2
n(q¯)) is as required in ⊗6
]
.
⊗7 if (m¯, q¯) ∈ Q
∗
D and k < ω then we can find q¯
1 such that (m¯, q¯) ≤ (m¯, q¯1), n(q¯1) = n(q¯)
and for every η ∈ n(q¯
1)2, the condition q1η forces some mη to be in wη \ {k}
[Why? proof similar to that of ⊗6 . ]
Now for every η ∈ (ω2)V [G
∗] we know that V [Gη] |= “
˜
p[Gη] ∈ P ,
˜
r is still a P -name of
a member of (2ω)
V [Gη ][
˜
GP ]
and T
˜
p[Gη ][
˜
r] is not
˜
w[Gη]-large”, by 1.7 this holds in V [G
∗] too.
A closer look shows that for η 6= ν (from (ω2)V [G
∗]) the tree T
˜
p[Gη ][
˜
r]∩T
˜
p[Gν ][
˜
r] has finitely
many splittings. So the conditions
˜
p[Gη],
˜
p[Gν ] are incompatible in P
V [G∗]. Contradiction
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to “P is c.c.c. Souslin and this is absolute (1.4(1))”. 1.9
1.5
Now we can answer Velickovic’s question for Souslin forcings.
1.10 Conclusion: Let P be a c.c.c. Souslin forcing, adding a new real.
(1) The following is impossible: for every P -name of a new
˜
r ∈ ωω for some tree T ⊆ ω>ω,
T ∈ V and p ∈ P we have p ⊢P “
˜
r ∈ limT”, and
∧
n<ω |T ∩
nω| ≤ 2n, we can replace:
“for every n” by “for infinitely many n”.
(2) The following is impossible: for some P -name of a new
˜
r ∈ ωω for every strictly
increasing {ni : i < ω} ⊆ ω from V for some tree T ⊆
ω>ω, T ∈ V and p ∈ P we
have p ⊢P “
˜
r ∈ limT” and
∧
i<ω |T ∩
niω| ≤ 2i, we can replace: “for every i” by “for
inifinitely many i”.
(3) The following is impossible: for some P -name
˜
r of a new member of ω2 for every
strictly increasing {ni : i < ω} ⊆ ω from V for some tree T ⊆
ω>2 and q we have
q ∈ P and q ⊢P “
˜
r ∈ limT” and
∧
i<ω |T ∩
ni2| ≤ 2i.
(4) The following is impossible: for some r ∈ (ω2)V
P
\ ω2 for every strictly increasing
sequence 〈ni : i < ω〉 ∈ V of natural numbers, for some tree T ⊆
ω>2 from V we have:
r ∈ limT , and (∃∞i)|T ∩ ni2| ≤ i2 or at least (∃∞i)|T ∩ (ni+1)2| ≤ 2ni .
Proof: (1), (2) follow by part (3) . Suppose that
˜
r is a P -name of a new member of ωω . Let
˜
ηn be (the P -name ) 0
˜
r(n)+1̂〈1〉 and let
˜
r∗ be the following P -name : the concatenation
of
˜
η0,
˜
η1,
˜
η2, . . . . By part (3) there is a strictly increasing sequence 〈ni : i < ω〉 of natural
numbers such that for no q ∈ P and T , does q ⊢ “
˜
r ∈ Lim(T ) ” and for inifinitely many
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i < ω we have (2) and replacing
˜
r will give (1) too .
(3) Follows from part (4).
(4) Let
˜
r be a P -name of a new real.
By Lemma 1.5 for some infinite u ⊆ ω we have
(∗) for every p ∈ P , Tp[
˜
r] is u-large (see 1.1(4)).
We now choose by induction on i, ni < ω, such that ni > sup{nj : j < i} and |(ni, ni+1)∩
u| > 2ni + 2. If (4) fails for
˜
r we apply the statement to the sequence 〈ni : i < ω〉, so for
some p ∈ P and subtree T of ω>2 from V , we have:
(a) p ⊢P “
˜
r ∈ limT”
(b) for infinitely many i < ω, we have |T ∩(ni+1) 2| ≤ 2ni .
By the choice of u, for some j∗ < ω, we know that Tp[
˜
r] has a splitting of level ∈ [j0, j1)
for each j0, j1 ∈ u, j
∗ < j0 < j1.
So if i > j∗, then |Tp[
˜
r] ∩ (ni+1)2| is at least the number of levels < ni+1 of splitting
nodes of Tp[
˜
r] which is ≥ |(ni, ni+1) ∩ u| which is > 2
ni . But p ⊢“
˜
r ∈ limT” implies
Tp[
˜
r] ⊆ T so |T ∩ (ηi+1)2| is > 2ni , ( for every i < ω such that i > j∗), this contradicts the
choice of T hence we finish. 1.10
1.11 Remark: This means that any c.c.c. Souslin forcing which is ωω-bounding is quite
similar to the Random real forcing in some sense. More exactly every c.c.c. Souslin forcing
has a property shared by the Random real forcing and the Cohen forcing.
1.12 Claim: 1) Assume
(a) P is a forcing notion
(b)
˜
r is a P -name of a member of ω2.
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(c) h¯ = 〈hn : n < ω〉, hn = n (i.e. hn(i) = n for every i < ω) and u ⊆ ω is infinite
(d) for every p ∈ P , for some η ∈ Tp[
˜
r] the set {k : η̂Ok−ℓgη̂〈1〉 ∈ Tp[
˜
r]} is
(u, h¯)-large (see (*) of 1.1(8)).
Then forcing with P add a Cohen real.
2) We can weaken (d) to
(d)− for every p ∈ P for some n < ω, and η0, . . . , ηn−1 ∈ Tp[
˜
r] the set {k : for some ℓ < n,
ηℓ̂Ok−ℓgηℓ̂〈1〉 ∈ Tp[
˜
r]} is (u, h¯)-large.
Proof: 1), 2) Let u \ {0} = {ni : 1 ≤ i < ω}, n0
def
= 0 < n1 < n2 < . . ., let 〈k(i, ℓ) :
ℓ < ω〉 be such that i =
∑
ℓ k(i, ℓ)2
ℓ, k(i, ℓ) ∈ {0, 1}, so k(i, ℓ) = 0 when 2ℓ > i. Let
ρ∗m = 〈k(i, ℓ) : ℓ ≤ [log2(i+ 1)]〉 where i = iu(m) is the unique i such that ni ≤ m < ni+1.
We define a P -name
˜
s (of a member of (ω2)V
P
) : let {
˜
ki : i < ω} list in increasing order
{k < ω :
˜
r(k) = 1} and
˜
s be ρ∗k0̂ρ∗k1̂ρ∗k2̂ . . ..
Clearly by condition (d)−, for every p ∈ P and n < ω we have p /⊢ “
˜
r(k) = 0 for every
k ≥ n”. Hence ⊢P “{k < ω :
˜
r(k) = 1} is infinite, hence ⊢P “
˜
s ∈ ω2”. It is enough to
prove that ⊢P “
˜
s is a Cohen real over V ”. So let T ∈ V be a given subtree of ω>2 which is
nowhere dense, i.e. (∀η ∈ T )(∃ν)[η ⊳ ν ∈ ω>2 \ T ], and we should prove ⊢P “
˜
s /∈ limT”.
So assume p ∈ P , p ⊢P “
˜
s ∈ limT” and we shall get a contradiction. Having our p ∈ P we
can apply (d)− (or (d) , which is stronger), so we can find n < ω and η0, . . . , ηn−1 ∈ Tp[
˜
r]
as there such that A = {k < ω: for some ℓ < n, ηℓ̂Ok−ℓgηℓ̂〈1〉 ∈ Tp[
˜
r]} is (u, h¯)-large.
Let for each ℓ < n, {kℓj : j < jℓ} list in increasing order {k < ℓg(ηℓ) : ηℓ(k) = 1}
and let ρℓ = ρ∗
kℓ0
̂ρ∗
kℓ1
̂ . . . ρ∗
kℓ
jℓ−1
. Now we can choose by induction on ℓ ≤ n, a sequence
νℓ ∈
ω>2 such that: ν0 = 〈〉, νℓ E νℓ+1 and ρℓ̂νℓ+1 /∈ T (each time use “T is nowhere
dense”).
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Next we choose m(∗) ∈ A such that νn E ρ∗m(∗); possible as A is (n, h¯)-large (check
Definition 1.1(8): the set {iu(m) : m ∈ A} contains an interval of length > 2
ℓg(νn), so by
the definition of ρ∗m, some m(∗) in this interval is as required). Now we can find p1 ∈ P
such that p ≤ p1 and p1 ⊢P “for some ℓ < n, ηℓ̂Om(∗)−ℓgηℓ̂〈1〉 E
˜
r” hence p1 ⊢P
“for some ℓ < n, ρℓ̂ρ∗m(∗) E
˜
s”, so by the choice of νℓ+1, and as νℓ+1 E νn E ρ∗m(∗) we
get p1 ⊢P “
˜
s /∈ limT” hence we get contradiction to: p ⊢P “
˜
s ∈ limT”, hence we finish
proving ⊢P “
˜
s is a Cohen real over V .” 1.12
1.13 Claim: Let P be a c.c.c. Souslin forcing
1) “P add a Cohen real” is absolute (as well as “x is a P -name of a Cohen real”).
2) “x is a P -name of a dominating real” is absolute.
3) “P add a non dominated real” is absolute (as well as “x is a P -name of a non dominated
real”).
4) for a given h¯, “ there is u ∈ [ω]ℵ0 such that (d) of Claim 1.12(1) holds” is absolute;
similarly (d)− of 1.12(2).
5) “x is a P -name of a member of ωω , dominating η1 ∈
ωω and not dominating η2 /∈
ωω
” is absolute (in fact , conjunction of
∏1
1 and
∑1
1 statements )
Proof: 1) Let ϕ(x) say:
(a) x = 〈〈pηi , t
η
i : i < ω〉 : η ∈
ω>ω〉, pηi ∈ P , t
η
i a truth value, 〈p
η
i : i < ω〉 a maximal
antichain, ( for each η ∈ ω≥ω )
(b) if η, ν ∈ ω>ω and pηi , p
ν
j are compatible then: [η E ν ∧ t
ν
j truth ⇒ t
η
i=truth] and
[η, ν are ⊳-incomparable
∧
&tηi=truth⇒ t
ν
j=false].
(c) for every p ∈ P for some η ∈ ω>ω for every ν, η E ν ∈ ω>ω, we have
∨
i<ω(p, p
ν
i
compatible ∧ tνi=truth).
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Now by 1.4(1)+(2) part (a) is a conjunction of
∏1
1 and
∑1
1 statements, part (b) is both∏1
1 and
∑1
1 and part (c) is
∏1
1 (we use: compatibility is both
∏1
1 and
∑1
1 and (∀p ∈ P ) [. . .]
means (∀p)[p /∈ P ∨ . . .]). So ϕ(x) is a conjunction of
∏1
1 and
∑1
1 statements. Now ϕ(x)
says “x represents a P -name of a Cohen real” so (∃x)ϕ(x) which is a
∑1
2 statement, express
the statement “forcing with P add a Cohen real.”
2) We repeat the proof of part (1) but clause (c) is replaced by:
(c)′ for every p ∈ P and f ∈ (ωω)V there are q ∈ P and n∗ such that p ≤ q and:
(c)q,f,n∗ if q, p
η
i are compatible, t
η
i truth and n
∗ ≤ n < ℓg(η) then f(n) ≤ η(n).
Now (c)q,f,n∗ is a
∏1
1 and
∑1
1, so (c)
′ has the form (∀p, f)[p /∈ ∨(∃q, n∗)[q ∈ P&p ≤
q&(c)q,f,n∗ ] which is
∏1
2 hence “x is a P -name of a dominating real” is an absolute state-
ment.
3) Use the proof of Part (1) but clause (c) is replaced by:
(c)′′ for p ∈ P for infinitely many n the set {η(n) : η ∈ ω>ω, ℓgη > n, i < ω, tni =
truth, pηi , p compatible} is infinite.
Now (c)′′ is
∏1
1 and we can finish as there.
4) The statement (d) and (d)− from 1.12 for given p,
˜
r, h¯, u is a
∏1
1 statement (as by the
proof of 1.7(1) ν ∈ Tp[
˜
r] is a
∏1
1-statement and a
∑1
1-statement .)
5) Easier than the proof of (3) 1.14
1.14 Conclusion: If P is a c.c.c. Souslin forcing notion adding
˜
g ∈ ωω not dominated by
any f ∈ (ωω)V then forcing with P add a Cohen real.
Proof: Without loss of generality,
˜
g is strictly increasing. Let
˜
r = {
˜
g(i) : i < ω}, it is a
subset of ω identified with its characteristic function. We imitate the proof of Lemma 1.5
(using here 1.13(3) instead of 1.7 there) so as there without loss of generality there is a
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Ramsey ultrafilter D on ω and let the forcing notion QD be as there. Let h¯ be as in Claim
in 1.12 condition (c); we ask:
⊗1 is there an infinite u ⊆ ω such that condition (d)− of claim 1.12 holds?
If yes we are done by claim 1.12 . So from now on we asssume not.
Let G ⊆ QD be generic over V , condition (d)
− fails also in V [G] (using absoluteness
which holds by claim 1.13(4)), in particular for u =df
˜
w[G]. For p ∈ PV [G] and η ∈ ω>2
we let
C[η, p] =df {k : η̂0k−ℓg(η)̂〈1〉 ∈ Tp[
˜
r]}.
Hence for some p∗ ∈ PV [G], (remeber (*) of 1.1(8)) :
(∗)1 V [G] |= “ for every j < ω and η
∗
ℓ ∈ Tp∗ [
˜
r] for ℓ < j for some n∗ letting C =df
⋃
{C[η∗ℓ , p
∗] : ℓ < j} , for no n∗ + 1 consequtive members i0 < i1 < .... < in∗ of u do we
have : for every m < n∗ the sets [im, im+1) , C are not disjoint ”.
Let for n < ω , h0(n) be like n
∗ in (∗)1 for {η
∗
ℓ : ℓ < j} =
df T
˜
p∗ [
˜
r] ∩ n≥2. Let for
n < ω , h(n) =df
∑
i≤n(h0(i) + 1). Note that we have: h is strictly increasing .
So for some q∗ ∈ G (which is a subset of QD ) , and QD-name
˜
p∗ of a member of P ,
we have: q∗ forces that
˜
p∗,
˜
h,
˜
C[η,
˜
p∗] (for η ∈ ω>2 , ) are as above.
Wlog 0 ∈ wq
∗
.
Let
˜
w =
˜
w ∪ {0} = {
˜
ni : i < ω} be strictly increasing , note
˜
w,
˜
ni are QD-names.
Wlog
⊗2 for every k ∈ Aq
∗
and subset v of Aq
∗
∩k the condition (wq
∗
∪v∪{k}, Aq
∗
\(k+1))
forces a value to the following:
(A) T
˜
p∗ [
˜
r] ∩ k≥2, say t
(B) truth value to [
˜
ni,
˜
ni+1) ∩ C[η,
˜
p∗] = ∅ for η ∈ t and i ≤ k + 1.
So
16
⊗3 Assume q1 ≥ q
∗, n < ω and q1 forces
˜
h(n) = n∗ and T
˜
p∗ [
˜
r] ∩ n≥2 = t. If
i0 < .... < in∗ are the first n
∗ + 1 members of Aq1 , then for some m < n∗ the condition
q2 =
df (wq1 ∪ {i0, ..., im−1}, A
q1 \ im) forces that:
for no η ∈ t and j do we have: im−1 ≤ j < Min(
˜
w \ (im−1 + 1)) and j ∈ C[η,
˜
p∗].
Now we want to imitate the proof of 1.9 . We define a forcing notion Q∗∗ = Q∗∗D as
follows :
a member of Q∗∗D has the form (m¯, q¯) such that:
(1) q¯ = 〈qν : ν ∈
n2〉, q∗ ≤ qν ∈ QD, n = n(q¯) ,
(2) for each ν ∈ n2 the number i[qν ] =
df Max(wqν) is well defined,
(3) qν forces (in QD) a value tν to T
˜
p∗ [
˜
r] ∩ n≥2 and a value hν(j) to
˜
h(j) for j ≤ n
and a value cν(η,
˜
p∗) to
˜
C(η,
˜
p∗) ∩ i[qν ]
(4) qν ⊢QD “ if η ∈ tν then for no k do we have: i[qν ] ≤ k < Min(
˜
w \ (i[qν ] + 1)) and
k ∈ C[η,
˜
p∗] ”
(5) m¯ = 〈mi : i ≤ n〉, mi < ω and
(6) if ν̂〈j〉 E νj ∈ n2 for j = 0, 1 and η ∈ tν0 ∩ tν1 then cν0 [η, p∗] ∩ cν1 [η, p∗] is
bounded by max{mℓg(η), mℓg(ν)}
The order is defined by : (m¯1, q¯1) ≤ (m¯2, q¯2) iff n(q¯1) ≤ n(q¯2), m¯1 = m¯2↾(n(q¯1) + 1)
and for η ∈ n(q¯
2)2 we have q1
η↾n(q¯1)
≤ q2η.
We now continue as in the proof of 1.9 .
Why are the
˜
p∗[Gν ] for ν ∈
ω2 pairwise incompatible? If ν1, ν2 are not equal , and
˜
p∗[Gν1 ],
˜
p∗[Gν2 ] are compatible in P let p be a common upper bound. We know that for
some η ∈ Tp[
˜
r] we have C[η, p] is infinite as otherwise from Tp[
˜
r] we can define a function
f ∈ ωω such that q ⊢P “
˜
g ≤ f” contradicting the assumption .
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1.14
∗ ∗ ∗
The question is whether a forcing adding half Cohen real (see below) adds a Cohen
real is due to Bartoszyn´ski and Fremlin, appears in [B].
1.15 Definition: If V ⊆ V 1, r ∈ (ωω)V
1
we say that r is a half Cohen real over V if for
every η ∈ (ωω)V , for infinitely many n < ω, r(n) = η(n).
1.16 Conclusion: If a ccc Souslin forcing add a half Cohen real then it adds a Cohen
real.
Proof: If
˜
r is a P -name a member of ωω which is (forced to be) half Cohen over V , then
⊢P “
˜
r ∈ ωω is not dominated by any “old” h ∈ ωω (i.e. h ∈ (ωω)V ” trivially-you can use
the definition on h+ 1 to get strict inequality. Now use 1.14.
1.17 Claim : Assume Q is a ccc Souslin forcing and
˜
r is a Q-name of a member
of ωω . Assume further that for some η ∈ ωω , a Cohen real over V and G , a subset
of QV [η] generic over V [η] we have
˜
r[G] dominate η i.e. for every n < ω large enough
η(n) ≤
˜
r[G](n) .
Then ( in V )
˜
r is forced by some q ∈ QV to be a dominating real i.e. for every G , a
subset of QV generic over V to which p belongs and ρ ∈ (ωω)V [G] , for every n < ω large
enough ρ(n) ≤
˜
r[G](n)
Proof : Assume that not ; then some p ∈ QV [η] force the negation , i.e
˜
r is as above
but the conclusion fail . By the homogeneity of Cohen forcing there is a Cohen name
˜
p of
such a condition .
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Also in V there is a maximal antichain J of Q and sequence 〈ρq : q ∈ J〉 such that for
each q ∈ J either q forces that
˜
r does not dominate ρq and ρq ∈ (
ω(ω \ {0}) OR q forces
that
˜
r dominate every ρ ∈ (ωω)V and ρq(n) = 0 for every n < ω (all in V ) . Now we can
find ρ∗ ∈ ωω dominating all ρq for q ∈ J .
Also wlog
˜
p is above some some q∗ ∈ J so necessarily ρq∗(n) 6= 0 .
We define a forcing notion R as follows: members has the form (f, g) where for some
n = n(f) < ω, f is a function from n>2 to ω and g is a function form ω to ω . The order is:
(f1, g2) ≤ (f2, g2) iff n(f1) ≤ n(f2) , f2 extend f1, for every n < ω we have g1(n) ≤ g2(n)
and for every k satisfying n(f1) ≤ k < n(f2) , for all except at most one ν ∈
k2 we have
g1(k) ≤ f2(ν) .
subclaim Let G be a subset of R generic over V .
(1) In V [G] , for every ν ∈ ω2 , ην =
df f ◦ ν = 〈f(ν↾ℓ) : ℓ < ω〉 is a Cohen real over V , so
(2) pην =
df
˜
p[ην ] is a member of Q
V [η] which by absoluteness is a subset of QV [G] .
Now in V [ην ] clearly pην forces that
˜
r dominate ην but not ρ
∗ . By absoluteness this holds
also in V [G] . Now if ν1, ν2 are distinct members of (
ω2)V [G] and pην1 , pην2 are compatible
in QV [G] , let p∗ ∈ QV [G] be a common upper bound then it forces that
˜
r dominates ρ∗ ,
but it is also above a member q∗ of J such that ρq∗ is not a sequence of zeroes.
By absoluteness we get a contradiction . 1.17
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